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ABSTRACT
The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic State.
President Barack Obama’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy the
terrorist group’ faces serious problems due to political obstacles in obtaining
Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and more
importantly because of neglect of the crucial role of private contractors.
Although the narrative has changed, and there is no public mention of con-
tractors, they remain central to all that the Department of Defense does in the
US and abroad. Suggestions are offered on how their performance can be
improved to support President Obama’s strategy.
KEYWORDS Strategy. Islamic State; Private Contractors; Inherently Governmental Functions; Contracting
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The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic
State (IS, also called ISIL, ISIS, and Daesh). After overcoming the initial
shock of the speed with which the IS conquered land, cities, and people
in Iraq, President Barack Obama issued a strategy to combat the IS. The
strategy, however, faces severe problems in implementation not only
due to the scope and complexity of the threat, but even more impor-
tantly because of the politics involved in the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force (AUMF) and the inevitable reliance on private contrac-
tors for the implementation of any strategy. While there was a great
deal of public attention to the use of private contractors in the previous
conflict in Iraq (2003–2011), currently there is virtually none. Even
though the narrative has changed, and the role of contractors has so
far been neglected in the current conflict, the argument in this paper is
that private contractors are a crucial element in the implementation of
any strategy, and they must be recognized and somehow integrated
into that strategy if it is to be successful. Suggestions are offered on
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how the contractors can be better coordinated to implement a strategy
and how oversight over contracts can be improved.1
‘We don’t have a strategy yet’
After the Islamic State conquered Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq in
early June 2014, President Obama stated on 4 September with regard to
ISIS – ‘We don’t have a strategy yet.’2 This statement did not go over well,
and on 10 September he declared that the strategy of the US is as follows:
‘We will degrade, and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and
sustained counter-terrorism strategy.’ The four elements of the strategy
are: 1. A systematic campaign of airstrikes against ISIL; 2. Increased support
to forces fighting ISIL on the ground; 3. Drawing on our substantial
counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks; and, 4. Providing
humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians displaced by ISIL. And, in
stating that ‘it will take a long time to eradicate a cancer like ISIL,’
President Obama recognized that the strategy would have to be long
term.3 In terms of the four possible strategies in dealing with the IS,
President Obama’s is clearly what Stuster and French term counterterror-
ism plus.4 Prior to proclaiming the strategy, from 8 August 2014, the
United States initiated a series of airstrikes to limit the threat to displaced
persons and also to hinder IS advances towards the Kurdish administrative
capital of Irbil. There is no doubt but that the threat of the IS, which now
has affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Nigeria, and
sympathizers globally, is serious. The challenge to formulating a strategy in
this context is also very serious. The severity of the threat has been
described frequently and at length by a great number of scholars and
think tanks. For example, in a recent article Anthony H. Cordesman of the
1I wrote a book on contracting out using official US government sources and interviews I personally
conducted with 40 key actors in the government and contractors during six week-long research trips
to Washington DC. I undertook this onerous task as I found that most books on the topic of
contracting out were based on sources of dubious accuracy, and many of the authors did not
seem to realize that contracting out is not only legal but strongly encouraged in US law and policy. In
writing this paper I have again turned to official sources, including government - sponsored websites
listing solicitations for contracts. I have also drawn heavily on my contacts that include current and
retired US government civilians and officers, contracting officers, instructors in contracting, and
lawyers who have defended the largest firms in the industry. Then too, following a long academic
career, the last three decades of which were in the Department of Defense where I often employed
contractors, I established my own contracting firm and now bid on solicitations from the Department
of Defense and other government agencies. The opinions expressed here are the author's alone and
do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Navy or Department of Defense.




4J. Dana Stuster and Bill French, Confronting the Islamic State: An Assessment of US Strategic Options
(Washington DC: National Security Network Feb. 2015) available at <www.nsnetwork.org>, 4.
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Center for Strategic and International Studies states: ‘The United States is
dealing with at least three major Islamic extremist or jihadist movements
in both Iraq and Syria: Daesh, the Al Nusra Front, and the Khorasan group.
It is trying to help Iraq recover from the near civil war between Sunni and
Shi’ite, and Arab and Kurd triggered by ex-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,
and it must deal with Iraqi government forces with strong links to Shi’ite
militias and Iran-forces hostile to the United States.’5 Despite the serious-
ness and complexity of the threat of IS, I agree with Thomas G. Mahnken,
in his chapter, ‘Strategic Theory’, that strategy can also deal with non-state
actors, including Islamic terrorists. As Mahnken writes: ‘The strategic ques-
tions most relevant to the struggle against Islamic terrorist networks differ
little from those in previous wars.’6 The enemy in the conflict, in this case
IS, while extremely serious, is not the biggest problem, and not the one I
want to analyze in this paper.
Strategy
The scholarly literature on strategy and strategic studies is stimulating. The
influence of Carl von Clausewitz is found in virtually all of this literature, and
sets a very high bar for scholarship. In the simplest, and most basic, for-
mulation strategy is about applying means to ends. As the foremost British
scholar on strategy writes: ‘Strategy is a profoundly pragmatic business: it is
about doing things, about applying means to ends.’7 However, without
political support strategy is bound to fail, for as Mahnken writes ‘In the
absence of a coherent policy, strategy becomes meaningless because it
lacks direction.’8 There must be a political or policy element in strategy,
and its implementation. Strategy, to be successful, must consider the real,
vs. imagined, capabilities. As Mahnken states in this same chapter ‘Although
policy drives strategy, the capabilities and limitations of the military instru-
ment also shape policy.’9 This same emphasis, on policy and capabilities, is
reiterated in Mahnken and Maiolo, when they write on the first page of the
‘General Introduction’ to a collection on strategic studies – ‘Because the
stakes in war are so high, strategy is a supremely practical endeavor. The
most elegant theory is useless if it lacks practical application.’10 In cutting
through the learned and stimulating discussion on war, politics, and strategy
5CSIS, Commentary, 13 Feb. 2015; available at <http://csis.org> See also the frequent commentary at
the Institute for the Study of War at <www.understandingwar.org/>.
6Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’ in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin Grey (eds.), Strategy in
the Contemporary World, 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP 2010), 80.
7Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: CUP
2013), 12.
8Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’, 69.
9Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’, 71.
10Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo, Strategic Studies: A Reader (London: Routledge 2008), 1–2.
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the main issue for me is whether a strategy can not only be formulated, but
also, implemented; this latter requirement necessitates an analysis of the
instruments for implementing a strategy. Otherwise, as Strachan writes ‘The
word strategy has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning,
and left it only with banalities.’11 A pertinent example of awareness of this
banality is Robert Gates’ comments on U.S. national security strategy docu-
ments. ‘Personally, I don’t recall ever reading the president’s National
Security Strategy when preparing to become secretary of defense. Nor did
I read any of the previous National Defense Strategy documents when I
became secretary. I never felt disadvantaged by not having read these
scriptures.’12
The Need for Coherent Policy and the Authorization for Use of
Military Force
An outsider may assume that with knowledge and political will a government
can formulate and implement a strategy. Although this might possibly be the
case in a parliamentary form of government, such as Great Britain, or one in
which the president’s power is unquestioned, as was the case in Colombia
under President Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010), it clearly is not the case in the United
States where the separation of powers, enshrined in the Constitution, is sacro-
sanct. Much of the current political discussion in the United States over strategy
to combat IS harks back to the War Powers Resolution of 1973 regarding the
powers of the two branches to commit the armed forces to combat.13 Between
the administration of George Washington and today, the US have made eleven
formal declarations of war against foreign nations in five different wars.
Obviously, American forces have been utilized more than 11 times over 217
years.14
Both the Korean and Viet Nam Wars were undeclared. As the Viet Nam
War dragged on and became more and more unpopular in the US,
members of Congress became concerned with the erosion of congres-
sional power to decide when the United States should become involved
in a war or the use of armed forces that might lead to war. The US
Constitution allocates different aspects of war powers to the legislative
and executive branches. On 7 November 1973, Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) over the veto of President Nixon. The
Resolution states that the president’s powers as Commander-in-Chief,
11Strachan, The Direction of War, 27.
12Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York:. Knopf 2014), 144.
13See Richard F. Grimmett, ‘War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,’ Congressional Research
Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 23 Sept. 2009.
14On the use of military force by the US, see Barbara Salazar Torreon, ‘Instances of Use of United States
Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2015’, CRS Report for Congress 15 Jan. 2015.
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under Article II of the Constitution, to commit US forces into action or
potential action are exercised only pursuant to: (1) a declaration of war
(which responsibility lies with Congress); (2) specific statutory authoriza-
tion; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United
States or its forces.
It requires the President in every possible instance to consult with Congress
before introducing American armed forces into hostilities or imminent
hostilities unless there has been a declaration of war or other specific
congressional authorization. It also requires the President to report to
Congress any introduction of forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities
. . . into foreign territory while equipped for combat. . . or in numbers which
substantially enlarge US forces equipped for combat already in a foreign
nation . . . . Once a report is submitted ‘or required to be submitted’,
Congress must authorize the use of forces within 60 to 90 days or the
forces must be withdrawn. It is important to note that since the War
Powers Resolution’s enactment over President Nixon’s veto in 1973, every
President has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement
by the Congress on the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief. The
courts have not directly addressed the question.15
The “courts” which here means the Supreme Court, have not addressed the
question because neither the executive nor the legislative branch wants to
risk having the issue decided by an outside body, with a 50/50 chance that it
will be to its detriment. Currently, regarding the conflicts in Iraq and Syria,
attention is focused on an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). To
implement the Administration’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy
the Islamic State organization’, President Obama originally relied on either
the AUMF of 2001 or presidential powers under Article II of the Constitution.
The political debate, which began in mid-2014, continues until the present.
In an effort to resolve the impasse, in February 2015 President Obama sent a
letter to Congress with a proposal for a new AUMF against the IS.16 The
issue of strategy, to combat the IS, is intricately involved with party politics,
and it is unclear if and when it will be resolved given the political party
division between the executive and legislative branches of the US
Government. In the meantime, I agree with the following statement regard-
ing President Obama’s strategy. ‘Until Congress passes new AUMF legisla-
tion, the war will remain on a precarious and politically vulnerable legal
footing that could undermine its legitimacy and leave US policy more
vulnerable to domestic politics.’17 In short, today there is not a coherent
15Richard F. Grimmett, ‘War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,’ 1. For an update see Matthew
C. Weed, ‘The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice,’ CRS Report for Congress 3 April 2015.
16For information on President Obama’s letter and the general issue of AUMF see Matthew C. Weed,
‘2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application’, CRS
Report for Congress 14 April 2015, 8, 19.
17Stuster and French, Confronting the Islamic State.
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policy to implement President Obama’s strategy regarding the IS. It is in this
context, one without a new AUMF, that attention to the role of private
contractors is warranted.
Contractors in War: A Toxic Topic
In early 2015 I spoke with the editor of the academic press that published
my book on US civil-military relations and the use of private security con-
tractors in Afghanistan and Iraq and asked him why it had not sold as well as
I had hoped. He responded that none of the books published by his press or
other academic presses on this topic had sold well as the topic of contrac-
tors in combat had turned toxic. I believe the editor is correct, and I can offer
three reasons for this fact: the heavy reliance on contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the unrelenting negative reporting on contractors, and the
cognitive dissonance regarding popular perceptions of the selfless and
service-oriented uniformed military personnel and the money-grasping con-
tracting firms and their highly paid employees.
First, the often-duplicated table below demonstrates the heavy reliance
on contractors as they almost equaled US troops in Iraq in 2008.18
Even after the departure of US troops in December 2011 a significant
number of contractors continued to be employed in Iraq. According to a
reliable source, 3,260 US contractors remained in March 2012 after all US
troops had departed.19
Second, during the conflict, the role of contractors, and especially private
security contractors, in Iraq became a very public and polemic issue. On 7
February and 2 October 2007, the House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform held hearings on contractors in Iraq.20
The hearings, and the resultant staff memorandum released by Committee
Chair, Congressman Henry Waxman, drew immediate widespread negative
attention to contractors in general and to Blackwater USA in particular.21
Many sectors of the think tank and non-governmental organization (NGO)
communities, as well as investigative reporters, also became interested in
reporting on the contractors after those hearings which motivated the US
18Congressional Budget Office (CBO) ‘Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq’ (Washington DC:
CBO, Aug. 2008), 12.
19Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, ‘Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support
Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress 17
May 2013, 25.
20There was a political party dimension to the hearings. Representative Henry Waxman, who assumed
the chairmanship of the committee after the 2006 elections gave the Democratic Party a majority in
both houses of Congress, immediately ramped up the committee’s activities on the conduct of post-
combat operations, an area his Republican predecessor had neglected. In mid 2009 there were
25,500 PSCs in Iraq.
21See the committee website: <http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1509>; also, author interviews
with committee staff members, Washington DC, 7 Jan. 2009.
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Congress to not only hold more hearings and pass laws to regulate the use
of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to create three large and
well–staffed organizations to focus specifically on the use of large sums of
tax-generated money for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. In this
regard, the Congress created in 2004 the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) and in 2008 the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Between its creation in 2004 and its
final Report in March 2013, SIGIR dealt with all imaginable topics surround-
ing the use of the $60 billion of US funds allocated by the Congress for the
reconstruction of Iraq. The focus on contractors was a central element of
SIGIR’s work.22
Even more specifically regarding contracting out, in the face of scandals
and allegations of fraud, the US Congress created in 2008 the Commission on
Wartime Contracting to examine contracting out in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
their final report Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing
risks, of August 2011, the Commission states that at least $31 billion, and
possibly as much as $60 billion has been lost to contract waste and fraud in
Iraq and Afghanistan.23 Virtually all of the official (including the Congressional
Research Service and the Government Accountability Office) and academic
studies of contracting out in Iraq identify major problems with the process
and intended results of using contractors. And, most recently there was
extensive reporting on the conviction, in October 2014, and sentencing, in
April 2015, of four Blackwater USA private security contractors for their killing
17 unarmed civilians in Nisour Square in Baghdad in October 2007.
Third, the standard perception is that the state holds a monopoly on the
use of force in a given territory or nation, and it is the professional armed
forces that are the main instrument of that force. Books and public opinion
polls demonstrate and reinforce the positive view of the selfless dedication
to service and to the US of these professional armed forces.24 Once the
profit motive, which is at the basis of contracting out enters in, there is a
generalized cognitive dissonance about how the US exercises force to
implement a strategy.
22The SIGIR Final Report, Learning from Iraq, March, 2013, notes that there were 90,000 contracting
actions, and ‘Although US government agencies managed the reconstruction program in Iraq,
contractors performed the bulk of the work on the ground.’ 37 for the 90,000 and 51 for the
quote. During the period of its operation it produced 35 Quarterly Reports to the US Congress, 220
audits, 170 inspections, 82 convictions, 9 lessons-learned reports, 3 special reports and 1 evaluation,
35 congressional testimonies, and 34 IG trips to Iraq, 133.
23The Final Report to Congress of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks Aug. 2011 is available at <www.
wartimecontracting.gov.> Accessed 30 Jan. 2015. SIGAR still functions.
24Among other sources see the article by Andrew A. Hill, Leonard Wong, and Stephen J. Gerras, ‘Self-
Interest Well Understood”: The Origins & Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military”’, Daedalus 142/
2 (Spring 2013), 49–64.
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Today there is absolutely nomention of the use of contactors in implement-
ing the strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy the IS. It is as though with
the conviction and sentencing of the four contractors the US has closed a
chapter on contracting and armed conflict. I have not found a single reference
to the use of contractors in the mainline news media, official reports, or
publications from think tanks. Even the extremely complete and authoritative
CRS Report for Congress on the issue of the IS, which is updated monthly, and
which finishes, on pages 36 and 37 with ‘Possible Questions for Congressional
Consideration [to pose to the Executive]’ does not include in the sixteen
questions suggested, a single one on the use of contractors.25 In the Senate
hearing, US Senate Committee on Armed Services, ‘Global Challenges and US
National Security Strategy,’ 27 January 2015, during the three and a half hours
of testimony, questions, and answers, with General Mattis, General Keane, and
Admiral Fallon, all retired, most of it focused on Iraq, Syria, and the IS, there was
no reference to contractors.26 And, in the Policy Report by J. Dana Stuster and
Bill French, Confronting the Islamic State: An Assessment of US Strategic Options
there is no mention of contractors.27 For that matter, President Obama’s
National Security Strategy of February 2015 makes no mention of contractors.
Insofar as this document depicts President Obama’s doctrine, the use of con-
tractors is totally neglected. The question arises, however, who will fight the
ISIS? Currently, the political focus has been on the AUMF and the very hypothe-
tical use of uniformed troops, rather than the certainty of reliance on contrac-
tors in Iraq.
Boots on the Ground
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statutorily the principal military
advisor to the President, General Martin E. Dempsey raised the possibility
that the strategy may necessitate ‘boots on the ground’ in his testimony to
the Senate Armed Services committee on 16 September 2014. President
Obama, in his speech at Central Command (CENTCOM) on 17 September
2014 reiterated his firm intention to not put ‘boots on the ground’. So far, as
of May 2015, President Obama has authorized the deployment of 3,100 US
military personnel to Iraq to advise Iraqi forces, gather intelligence on the IS,
and secure US personnel and facilities.28 None of these troops are to engage
25Kenneth Katzman, Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Rhoda Margesson, and Matthew C.
Weed, ‘The “Islamic State” Crisis and US Policy’, CRS Report for Congress, 8 Jan. 2015.
26See US Senate Committee on Armed Services, ‘Global Challenges and US National Security Strategy’,
27 Jan. 2015 available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-01-27-global-challenges-and-
us-national-security-strategy>.
27Stuster and French, Confronting the Islamic State: An Assessment of US Strategic Options.
28Katzman et al, 8 Jan. 2015. 10. It is worth noting that the UK, Canada, Australia and France have also
ruled out deploying ground combat forces in Iraq. See Louisa Brooke-Holland and Claire Mills,
International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, ‘ISIS: the military response
in Iraq and Syria’, 17 Oct. 2014, 3.
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in combat. Several important political figures, including Republican Senator
John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Republican Senator Lindsay Graham also on the Armed Services
Committee, at least five other Republican hopeful presidential candidates,
very influential retired general Keane and the Institute for the Study of War
forcefully advocate ‘boots on the ground’, including in a combat capacity.
Seeking Contractors for Work in Iraq
The issue of ‘boots on the ground’ remains problematic. However, while there is
no mention in government documents, the mainline media, and think tank
reports on contractors and the US strategy in Iraq, contractors are already being
recruited to go to Iraq. The Army Contracting Command posted a request for
proposals (RFP) for Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors in Iraq on the
Federal Business Opportunities website on 28 January 2015.29 The Performance
Work Statement for the contract solicitation states ‘Contractor personnel shall
assist the military and government personnel assigned to OSC-I in the assess-
ment of MoD, counter terrorism service (CTS), or MoP processes, policies, and
systems and then advising, coaching, mentoring, training, and liaising with
MoD, CTS, or MoP officials to improve and refine these processes, policies, and
systems. The Contractor shall also ensure that training facilitation and the
degree of interaction between Contractor personnel and the Iraqis being
trained will conform to evolving local Iraqi requirements as may be agreed
upon between the Contractor and the Contracting Officer (KO).’30 Overlooking
the acronyms, poor grammar, and typos, it is clear that the Department of
Defense (DoD), and specifically the US Army, is seeking contractor personnel to
work in Iraq. Utilizing unclassified sources, there is conclusive evidence of
private contractors already in Iraq. As stated in a CRS Report, ‘The Office of
Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC – I), operating under the authority of the US
Ambassador to Iraq, is the primary Iraq – based US institution that interacts with
the Iraqi military . . . . The total OSC – I personnel numbers over 3,500 but the
vastmajority are security and support personnel, most of which are contractors.
Of the staff, about 175 are US military personnel and an additional 45 are
Defense Department civilians.’31 And, in an article by Dion Nissenbaum, ‘Role of
US Contractors Grows as Iraq Fights Insurgents,’ he states ‘The strategic deploy-
ment of defense contractors in Iraq underscores the shifting security landscape
as the US downsizes its military presence around the world. With fewer than
29See at <https://www.fbo.gov>.
30<https : / /acquis i t ion.army.mi l /asfi/so l ic i tat ion_view.cfm?psol ic i tat ionnbr=W560MY
14R0004>.
31Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights’, CRS Report for Congress 22 Aug.13,
36
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200 American military personnel in Iraq, continued US military support there
relies increasingly on the presence of contractors.’32
If there were so many contractors, a number almost equal to uniformed
personnel in Iraq, and yet a greater number in Afghanistan, it is difficult to
believe that contractors will not be heavily utilized in some capacity in the
fight against IS, under either a Democratic or Republication administration. To
better understand the factors surrounding the use of contractors in the strategy
against IS I will review three key concepts or elements. They are the concept of
inherently governmental functions, the scale of contracting out, and the aware-
ness of the necessity of contractors in DoD.
Inherently Governmental Functions
The legal framework for employment of contractors in the US is extensive, but
certain activities, or functions, are restricted to US government employees.33 In
the US the concept used to distinguish the areas of capabilities that are reserved
to US government employees, including the armed forces, is known as ‘inher-
ently governmental functions’. An inherently governmental function is a function
that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by
Federal Government employees.34 Due to concern that contractors were
engaged in tasks that should be restricted to US government employees,
which were not delimited due to differing concepts of inherently governmental
functions, the Congress in 2009 directed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to delimit inherently governmental functions, into one concept or defini-
tion. The OMB held a public discussion in June and also received 30,350 written
inputs, most of them form letters. That same June, the CRS published a back-
ground report to informmembers and staffers in Congress, and other interested
parties on the debate, issues, and options up to that point.35 The final result is a
‘Policy Letter 1-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical
Functions’ by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the OMB published
in the Federal Register of 12 September 2011.36
32Wall Street Journal, 4 Feb. 14, A.6. Blogs advertising for ‘shooters’ frequently advertise for personnel
to go to Iraq. See <www.shooterjobs.com.>. Protective Security Detail seems to be in great demand.
33In Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in US National Security (Stanford
UP 110–11, I discuss the legal basis for contracting out.
34See the Federal Register at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-12/pdf/2011-23165.pdf.> p. 56236
provides the definition of inherently governmental functions.
35John R. Luckey, Valerie Bailey Grasso, and Kate M. Manuel, ‘Inherently Governmental Functions and
Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,’ CRS Report for
Congress 15 June 2009. The CRS published an update to this report to assist the Congress on this issue.
See Luckey et al., “Inherently Governmental Functions,” (same document number), dated 14 Sept.2009.
36Federal Register at same website as above. Interviews with both Senate and House staffers, and
representatives of the industry made clear that the definition of what is inherently governmental was
viewed as crucial although from different perspectives. These interviews included Peter Levine, Kathy
Garman, of the Senate and House respectively, and Tara Lee and Michael Love of the industry. For an
industry perspective see Tara Lee, ‘Redefining Inherently Governmental: The Push to Redefine the
Function and Its Consequences’, Journal of International Peace Operations 4/1 (July-Aug.2008), 9–10.
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In the 12 September 2011 Policy Letter 1 - 01 in Appendix A certain tasks
are given as examples of inherently governmental functions which restrict
the use of contractors in combat, security, and the direction and control of
intelligence operations. ‘Boots on the ground’ which is defined as inherently
governmental in Appendix A, as ‘3. The command of military forces, espe-
cially the leadership of military personnel who are performing a combat,
combat support or combat service support role. 4. Combat.’ The tasks that
are not defined as inherently governmental remain ample, and are funda-
mental to all but the first of the four components of President Obama’s
strategy that he declared on 10 September 2014. The RFP noted above, is
clearly in support of #2 ‘Increased support to forces fighting ISIL on the
ground.’ 37
The Scale of Contracting Out
The second point that I want to make is that the scale of contracting out is
huge. Very few people, if any, outside of DoD and the industry have any
notion of the scale. I draw here upon official US Government sources to give
some insight into this scale. As stated in a 2014 CRS Report for Congress:
‘The Department of Defense (DOD) relies extensively on contractors to equip
and support the US military in peacetime and during military operations,
obligating more than $300 billion on contracts in FY 2013.’38 The $300
billion was equal to 49 per cent of the estimated $613.9 billion DOD budget
in FY 2013.39 The reaction of most outsiders when they hear that 49 per cent
of the defense budget goes to contracts is that it goes mainly to buy
expensive platforms including ships, submarines, and airplanes. This view
is incorrect. In the Fiscal Year 2013 contracting budget, supplies and equip-
ment, at $152.6 billion were 48 per cent of the total whereas services, at
$166.1 billion were 52 per cent.40 In short, 25 percent of the total defense
budget went to pay for service contracts in FY 2013.41
These two points lead into a conclusion best captured by the title of an
article by one of the first, and foremost, professional experts on contracting out,
37There is also a more recent CRS Report on this topic. See Kate M. Manuel, ‘Definitions of ‘Inherently
Governmental Function’ in Federal Procurement Law and Guidance’, CRS Report for Congress, 23 Dec,
2014.
38Moshe Schwartz,’ “Summary” ‘Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis and Issues for
Congress’, CRS Report for Congress 23 May 2014.
39For data on the overall DOD budget see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ‘National
Defense Budget Estimated for FY 2013’ available at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/
Documents/defbudget/fy2013/FY13_Green_Book.pdf>.
40Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition
System 2014 Annual Report, 4.
41The most recent CRS Report has the figure of services at 45 per cent, goods per cent and R & D at 10
per cent. See Moshe Schwartz, Wendy Ginsberg, and John F. Sargent Jr, ‘Defense Acquisitions: How
and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars’, CRS Report for Congress 30 April 2015, 6.
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Peter W. Singer, ‘Can’t Win with ‘em, Can’t Go to War without ‘em: Private
Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency.’42 Although Singer refers specifi-
cally to the PSCs, the point holds more broadly to other forms of contracting
out. An observation from virtually all of those I have interviewed for my book
and subsequent research, including those who work for the US government as
civilians or military officers, is that contractors are essential to all that the US
Department of Defense, including the armed services and the intelligence
agencies, do today. The most recent Congressional Research Service Report
on the topic of contracting out states, in the first sentences of the Introduction:
‘The Department of Defense (DOD) has long relied on contractors to provide
the US military with a wide range of goods and services, including weapons,
food, and operational support. Without contractor support, the United States
would currently be unable to arm and field an effective fighting force.’43
Indeed, if contracted services consumed a quarter of the DoD budget in
2013, it would not be surprising to find contractors in virtually every role and
mission.44 If they are essential, what, if any, are the impediments this fact poses
to the US developing and implementing a strategy to combat the IS? In what
follows I will first discuss three systemic, or structural impediments, and then,
after concluding that the contract is key, analyze the personnel issues that are
also impediments.
No Plan or Strategy
Robert Gates states the general, or systemic, issue clearly in Duty: Memoirs of a
Secretary at War. ‘As the contractor presence developed in Iraq after the
original invasion, there was no plan, no structure, no oversight, and no
coordination. The contractors’ role grew willy-nilly as each US department
or agency contracted with them independently, their number eventually
climbing to 150,000.’45 While the data in Table 1 has the number growing
to 190,000, the point remains the same: there was no coordination. Today,
there is still no coordination. Why this is an impediment to implementing a
strategy can be understood in light of the following quote fromMahnken and
Maiolo, ‘Because the stakes in war are so high, strategy is a supremely
practical endeavor. The most elegant theory is useless if it lacks practical
application.’46 Without coordination there can be no practical application.
42Policy Paper Number 4. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Sept. 2007. See also Peter W. Singer,
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2003)
43Moshe Schwartz et al., ‘Defense Acquisitions’ 1.
44To get a better sense of the scale and diversity of service contracts valued at almost $200 billion in
2011 see David Berteau et al. ‘US Department of Defense Service Contract spending and the
Supporting Industrial Base, 2000–2011’, at <www.acquisitionresearch.net/publications/>.
45Gates, Duty, 224.
46Mahnken and Maiolo, 1–2.
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Contracting is Extremely Decentralized
The first systemic impediment is that contracting out in DoD is decen-
tralized. We must remember from the section above that a total of $300
billion was contracted out in DoD in FY 2013. DoD itself consists of the
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), over 25 subordinate agencies,
three military departments, and a dozen combatant commands, not to
mention 1.3 million people on active duty, 885,000 in the National
Guard and Reserves, and another 775,000 civilian employees. It should
be no surprise that there is no single contracting office. Instead, any
element of DoD and the services that has a Unit Identification Code
(UIC) and a budget can contract out. I have done a rough survey of my
US Navy and Marine students, and all of their ships, and shore duty
units, had UICs and one or more budgets from which they could award
contracts.
Table 1 Presence of Contractor Personnel during US Military Operations
Conflict
Estimated Personnel Thousands Estimated Ratio of
contractor to
Military PersonnelaContractora Military
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a.
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6
Civil War 200 1,000 1 to 5
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a.
World War I 85 2,000 1 to 24
World War II 734 5,400 1 to 7
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5
Gulf War 9b 500 1 to 55b
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1
Iraq Theater as
of early 2008c
190 200 1 to 1
Sources: Congressional Budget Office based on data from William W. Epley, ‘Civilian Support of Field
Armies’ Army Logistician, 22 (Nov./Dec. 1990), 30–5; Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on the
Battlefield: What Have We Signed up for?’ Air Force Journal of Logistics 23/3 (Fall 1999), 10–19;
Department of Defense, Report on DoD Program for Planning, Managing, and Accounting for
Contractor Services and Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations (Oct. 2007), 12.
Note: n.a., ¼ not available.
a. For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed by the
US government. However, because most civilians present during military operations are contractor
personnel, the inclusion of government civilians should not significantly affect the calculated ratio of
contractor personnel to military personnel.
b. The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services during
Operations ‘Desert Shield’ and ‘Desert Storm’. Personnel associated with those provisions are not
included in the data or the ratio.
c. For this study, the Congressional Budget Office considers the following countries to be part of the
Iraq theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab
Emirates.
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While there is no single source which allows a researcher to identify
the exact number of UICs with budgets, a rough idea of the scale of the
units involved can be obtained by referring to the US government’s
website for contracting out. On 14 May 2015, on Fedbizopps there
were 29,900 ‘active federal opportunities’.47 In my rough survey of the
DoD entities advertising on Fedbizopps including agencies and the three armed
services, I found 125 vendors offering ‘active federal opportunities’; that is, those
posting solicitations for bids by contractors. With a great amount of time and
effort, one could see the ‘opportunities’ or solicitations for each of these
125. To offer one example, on 12 May 2015 the Army Contracting
Command, listed 1,400 solicitations. According the most recent CRS
Report on the topic, in FY 2014 DoD, with 64 per cent of the total of
contracts, obligated more money on federal contracts than all other
federal agencies combined.48 I will not conclude that 64 per cent of
the 29,900 solicitations (19,136) are for DoD, but undoubtedly they
number between 10,000 and 20,000.
Second, there is no single coordinating entity in DoD. There are indeed offices
in DoD, assistant secretaries in the services, and contracting commands, but the
doctrine to implement a unified approachwas very long in coming. Only in 2008,
in Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support, updated on 16 July 2014,
was a doctrine for future coordination promulgated.49 According to academic
experts who research and teach on government contracting, under normal
conditions it will take decades to institutionalize this doctrine, provided there is
sufficient support in personnel, institutions, and protocols. A fundamental chal-
lenge to the implementation or institutionalization is that currently command
authority and contracting authority in DoD is statutorily located in two different
chains.50 Joint Publication 4-10, once implemented, should remedy this
bifurcation.
Third, US government employees, civilian as well as military, are pro-
hibited from directly supervising contractors. The basic rule is as follows:
Contractors must manage their employees and perform in accordance
with the terms and conditions set forth in the contract and governed by
applicable laws and regulations. In more detail, the relevant text from the
10th Ethics Counselor’s Course states the following: ‘The Government
establishes a relationship with the contractor, which is defined by the
contract. Normally, government personnel do not exercise any of the
following functions over contractor employees: 1. Supervise or direct. 2.
47At <https://www.fbo.gov> accessed 14 May 2015. On 4 June 2015 there were 30,500.
48Schwartz et al., ‘Defense Acquisitions’, 2–3.
49Available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf> accessed 1 May 2015.
50For a proposal to deal with this problem see Cory Yoder, ‘The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal
Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting’, Acquisition Research Working Paper Series
available at <www.acquisitionresearch.net/publications/>.
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Approve leave or other absences. 3. Train or approve training . . . 4.
Conduct performance appraisals or other evaluations. 5. Provide or approve
awards and recognition. 6. Tell or suggest to a contractor whom to hire or fire. 7.
Discipline contractor employees.’51 This issue becomes extremely complicated,
as would anything regulated as it is by the very extensive and complicated rules
and policies listed in the 35 sources for the policy in the footnote. Very quickly
one enters into the realm of accusations of ‘conflict of interest’ that is very scary,
for US Government employees and contractors. Neither the CENTCOM
Combatant Commander, nor any officer below him, has authority or control
over the contractors. How to implement a strategy, should there be one,
without this control, is a fundamental challenge.
In conclusion, at the systemic level, the authority and funding for
contracting out is decentralized; there is no single institution in DoD to
coordinate contracting out, and the doctrine, as promulgated in Joint
Publication 4-10, may take a long time to implement; and, government
employees cannot direct, manage, or disciple contract employees. What
is clear, based especially on point three above, is that the contract itself
is crucial; it is key to what the contractor is hired to do. And, it is a
contracting officer whose responsibility it is to see that the contract is
awarded and fulfilled.
There are two main personnel issues concerning contracting officers,
and they will be the focus for the rest of this paper. They are, first, the
shortage of contracting officers to monitor fulfillment of the $300 billion
worth of contracts, and second the issue of the incentives to motivate
contracting officers. It should be noted that there is very wide realization
that contracting out, especially in DoD, is ‘broken’. The various CRS
reports say as much and there are currently two proposals, one by
Representative Mac Thornberry in the House of Representatives, and
another by Senator John McCain, in the Senate, to fix it.52
Contracting Officers, Few and Far Between
The single most important analysis of the challenge in supervising, monitor-
ing, or conducting oversight in contracting out security in Iraq was the
Gansler Commission Report, named for its chairman, The Honorable Jacques
Gansler who was Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics during the Clinton administration, publishes extensively on
51Available at <www.dod.mil/dodgc/. . .ethics/. . ./contractors_in_federal_workplace.pdf>.
52A summary can be found at Alex Haber and Raj Sharma, ‘Finding a Cure for What Ails Defense
Acquisition’, Government Executive 8 May 2015 available at <www.govexec.com/defense/2015/05/
cure-what-what-ails-defense-acquisition/112278>. The Congressman Thornberry bill builds on an
earlier House Armed Services Committee report ‘Challenges to Doing Business with the
Department of Defense’ of 19 March 2012 available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/index.
cfm/files/serve?File_id=f60b62cb-ce5d-44b7-a2aa-8b693487cd44>
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contracting issues, and currently holds a named chair for Public Policy and
Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland.53 The Commission report
directly addresses the fact that the contract management workforce had not
increased despite a seven-fold increase in the workload.54
In 1990, the Army had approximately 10,000 people in contracting. This was
reduced to approximately 5,500, where it has remained relatively constant
since 1996. . . . yet both the number of contract actions (workload) and the
dollar value of procurements (an indicator of complexity) have dramatically
increased in the past decade while the contracting workforce has remained
constant. The dollar value of Army contracts has increased 331 percent from
$23.3 billion in 1992 to $100.6 billion in 2006, while the number of Army
contract actions increased 654 percent from approximately 52,900 to 398,700
over the same period.
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of contract managers are civilians;
out of a total of 5,800, there were only 279 military personnel doing this
job.55 Military personnel can be deployed much more easily than can
civilians, and the report goes into some detail on why it is difficult to deploy
civilians. This means that the contract managers were not located in Iraq or
Afghanistan, where the contract work was being done, but rather in the
United States. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in
early 2009, Professor Gansler highlighted the sharp decrease in the number
of Army general officers involved in acquisitions, from five in 1990 to zero in
2007.56 This is of fundamental importance because, if there are no general
officer positions in the Army Contracting Corps, it cannot attract, much less
retain, motivated officers who are looking to advance in rank.
In bringing my research closer to today, following the departure of US
combat troops from Iraq in December 2011, I will focus mainly on the level
of oversight by contract personnel over the $300 billion in contracts.
According to data from the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) there were in February 2012 a total of 10,285 Administrative
Contracting Officers (ACO) who work under authority of FAR Part 42
‘Contract Administration and Audit Services’.57 These 10,285 ACOs audit
contracts valued at $300 billion. This would mean an average of
$29,168,692 in contracts for each contracting officer to monitor. Obviously,
this is a lot of money to keep track of.
53Gansler Commission Report ‘Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,’ report of the
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations’, 31 Oct. 2007.
54Gansler Commission Report, 30.
55Gansler Commission Report, 35, Table 9.
56The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, ‘Acquisition Reform: Achieving 21st Century National Security’,
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 111st Congress, 1st session, 3 March 2009:
table on p. 3. See also the Federal News Service for a transcript of his testimony, 3 Mar. 2009.
57Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Overview. TKO Seminar – DLA Land & Maritime, ND,
probably 2013. Available at <www.landandmaritime.dla.mil/Downloads/small_business/presenta
tions/TKO/DCMA.pdf>
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Contracting Oversight Personnel: The Absence of Incentives
The general issue of personnel in contracting out has been specifically
identified in the most current analyses of the many defects in contracting
out by the US government. It is telling that there are two important and
recent analyzes of the personnel challenges regarding the awarding and
oversight of contracts.58 One is the Staff Report for the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate, then Chaired by
Senator Carl Levin and Senator John McCain, as Ranking Minority
Member, of 2 October 2014, and the other is the survey for the
Professional Services Council of Acquisition Professionals in 2014. In the
former, the Senate staff solicited written inputs from 31 leading experts
on defense acquisitions, including practitioners, civilian and military, as
well as the leading scholars in the field. In the latter survey the
Professional Services Council solicited inputs from 50 high-level acquisi-
tion professionals.59 Both documents identify the personnel involved as
the weak link, the single point of failure, in the whole process of con-
tracting out. In the former the experts were asked to identify the defi-
ciencies of the defense acquisition process and steps that should be
taken to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. In the
‘Contributor Topic Matrix’ the three items on which there was overwhelming
consensus by the 31 Leading Experts or gurus were as follows: ‘Additional
workforce training needed’ with 71 per cent ‘Attract and retain quality work-
force’ with 71 per cent, and ‘Incentivize cost control’ with 71per cent The other
possible items, which were 11, had less than 50 per cent agreement.60 In the
latter report the Professional Services Council of Acquisition Professionals
analyzed the skills the acquisition workforce requires to perform their jobs
effectively. A summary of the survey states ‘. . . the workforce does not have
the skills needed to do the job as well as everyone wants, and demands. This is
not a failure of the workforce, but of our collective slowness to recognize the
need for major change in how we train, educate and support that workforce.’61
Yet a third important and relevant document proposes a solution to the
widely-recognized personnel problem identified in the two previously-cited
58The House Armed Services Committee report ‘Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of
Defense’ of 19 March 2012, has a section on ‘The Acquisition Workforce’, 36–45, which is also telling,
but will not be included here since the two utilized here are the most recent analyses of the
personnel issue in contracting out.
59Staff Report. ‘Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Compendium of Views by
Leading Experts’, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations United States Senate, 2 Oct. 2014.
Available at http:www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations. Professional Services Council
2014 Acquisition Policy Survey. Available at <http://issuu.com/professionalservicescouncil/docs/
2014_psc_survey_final?e=4503160/11053683>.
60Staff Report, United States Senate, 206.
61Taken from summary, Stan Soloway and Phil Kangas, ‘Fixing Acquisition: An Opportunity Lost?’
Government Executive available at <http://issuu.com/professionalservicescouncil/docs/2014_psc_sur
vey_final?e=4503160/11053683>.
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analyzes and reports is the 2014 Annual Report of the DoD on acquisitions.
This official government report begins with a ‘Foreword’ quoting the iconic
organizational theorist, Chester Barnard, author of The Function of the
Executive (first published in 1938) on the importance of incentives. The
report quotes Barnard: ‘Inadequate incentives mean dissolution, or changes
of organization purpose, or failure to cooperate. Hence, in all sorts of
organizations the affording of adequate incentives becomes the most defi-
nitely emphasized task in their existence. It is probably in this aspect of
executive work that failure is most pronounced.’ The very first line of this
report by the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics is ‘By human nature, performance is incentive-driven.’62 In short,
in order to line up, to organize, the staff to oversee implementation of a
strategy requires adequate incentives.
Together these three extremely important and telling reports analyze
in excruciating detail the very serious problems in the management and
oversight of contractors. To a greater or lesser extent, all three of them
propose incentives as the solution to the widely recognized personnel
problems.63 The analyst is thus compelled to examine the incentives for
contracting officers. The conclusion, the bottom line, is that they are
limited. For example, the differential in what a civilian contracting officer
is paid as a government employee, and what he or she could make
working for ‘the industry’, was a continuing theme in my interviews
with contracting officers.64 It should be remembered that contracting
officers, military and civilians, work in an office environment that is
similar to private office work. A telling datum is that in 2012 the
Federal Pay Cap on contractor’s salaries was $763,029.65 In that year
the federal pay cap for civilian employees of the DOD was $167,000.
With the maximum salaries possible for government employees less than
one quarter what a contractor might legally receive, the scale of what is
involved begins to become clear. This is not to say that many contractors
62Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Performance of the Defense
Acquisition System 2014 Annual Report (Washington DC: USD[AT&l], 13 June 2014, 4. Available at
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/ >, 2–15.
63The issue of negative, or perverse, incentives is identified in Michael J. Sullivan, Director Acquisition
and Sourcing Management, GAO, in his ‘Defense Acquisition: Addressing Incentives is Key to Further
Reform Efforts’ Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 30 April 2014.
(GAO-14-563T).
64I note that Stanger also calls attention to the ‘. . . government’s human capital crisis follows from the
diminished attractiveness of low-paying government positions when comparable work in the private
sector is available at higher pay.’ Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of
American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2009), 17. The lack of
financial incentives in government employ is a key theme in Paul C. Light, A Government Ill Executed:
The Decline of the Federal Service and How to Reverse It (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2008)
65Government Accountability Office, ‘Report to Congressional Committees. Defense Contractors.
Information on the Impact of Reducing the Cap on Employee Compensation Costs,’ Washington
DC: GAO, June 2013 (GAO-13-566), 2
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receive the Pay Cap, but for that matter contracting officers receive
nothing near the federal civil service pay cap. From my experience
most are in the range of GS-11 – GS 13, and the maximum in 2015 are
$66, 688 and $95,048 respectively.66 And, the most recent context is
marked by obligatory pay cuts for federal workers in sequesters and
government shut downs, resulting in furloughs in 2013 and 2014, hiring
freezes resulting in more work for fewer people, and three years with no
cost of living allowance (COLA) before the paltry 1 per cent increase in
2014. In sum, while there is much current concern about the manage-
ment and oversight of contractors, and the solution suggested is incen-
tives, there is little content to it. The crucial dimension, the humans who
oversee the contracts, have minimal incentives to excel.
Conclusion
It is impossible to know at this time if President Obama will receive the AUMF
from the Congress and if the US finally decides to put ‘boots on the ground’.
What is certain, however, is that contractors will play a central role in any US
presence in Iraq. Despite the current narrative that neglects the role of
contractors, there is no doubt but that they will be present in critical functions
just as they were previously in Iraq and currently in Afghanistan. As this is the
case, it makes sense for the US government, the executive and legislative
branches, to make as many improvements as possible. At a minimum these
would include the rapid implementation in Joint Publication 4-10, and the
institutions envisioned in it to coordinate contractors, and to increase both
the number of contracting officers and at the same time increase the incen-
tives in order to retain the best and stimulate all to fulfill their important roles
in monitoring contracts in order to actually implement President Obama’s
strategy to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL’.
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